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TITLE VII: LEGAL PROTECTION
AGAINST SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act' has been recognized since
its enactment as potentially one of the most important existing legal
tools with which to attack employment practices which discriminate
on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin. It has been stated
that Congress intended the Act to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when [they] operate invidiously
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifica-
tion, 12 and that it intended "discriminate" to be defined as broadly as
possible.3 For the most part, the courts have taken up the challenge
and given the statute a liberal and sympathetic interpretation.4 In a
recent series of decisions, however, several federal district courts have
departed from the well-established expansive reading of the statute to
remove an entire category of discriminatory activity from the Act's
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970). Section 2000e-2 provides:
(a) Employer practices.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
The inclusion of the word "sex" among the protected categories in Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act was a major victory for United States women, yet, ironically,
the battle for the amendment adding "sex" to the Act was fought by Southern male
legislators in the House of Representatives, presumably in the hope of defeating the
entire Civil Rights Act. The amendment was introduced after several weeks of debate
on the Act, the day before the final vote was taken, and passed without hearings and
with little serious discussion. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 2581, 2582 (1964) (remarks of
Rep. Green); K. DECRow, SEXIST JUSTICE 118 (1975); Kanowitz, Sex-Based Dis-
crimination in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS LJ. 305, 311 (1968); Miller, Sex Discrimina-
tion and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 883 n.34
(1967); Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DuKE L.. 671, 677 n.35 (1968);
Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 21 VAND. L. REv. 484, 491 (1968).
2. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
3. E.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) ("This language
evinces a Congressional intention to define discrimination in the broadest possible
terms").
4. Peck, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Developments in the
Administrative Process 1965-1975, 51 WASH. L. REv. 83 1, 865 (1976).
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purview-sexual harassment of an employee by an employer or super-
visor.5
Since 1974, there have been five district court cases involving
sexual harassment of employees. Three courts have held that Title VII
absolutely does not apply; 6 one court has acknowledged that there
could be situations involving sexual harassment of employees in which
Title VII might apply;7 and one court has fully embraced the applica-
tion of Title VII in sexual harassment cases. 8
In the first of the five cases, Barnes v. Train,9 the plaintiff claimed
that she was terminated because she refused her supervisor's request
for an "after-hours affair." The court held that she was discriminated
against not because of her sex but because she refused to engage in a
sexual relationship. This, the court asserted, evidenced not an arbi-
trary barrier to employment but rather an inharmonious personal rela-
tionship. This decision marked the introduction of two recurring
themes: whether the discriminatory conduct is gender-based, and
whether the supervisor can be treated as the representative of the em-
ployer. In Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,10 the fact situation was
5. Sexual harassment is almost exclusively a problem faced by women, and it
may take any of several forms. The verbal or physical advances to which a woman
finds herself subjected while on the job may be so offensive as to lead to a construc-
tive termination when she can no longer tolerate them. She may find herself trans-
ferred, fired, demoted, or refused promotion for refusing to go out with, or to engage
in a sexual relationship with, her employer or supervisor; or, for the same reasons,
she may be denied the job in the first place. The problem is a serious one. Safran,
What Men Do to Women on the Job: A Shocking Look at Sexual Harassment,
REDBOOK, November 1976, at 149 (92% of 9,000 women interviewed believed sexual
harassment to be a problem, and the majority of them found it a serious problem);
51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 148, 149 n.6 (1976) (citing a study showing that 49% of all
women employed at the United Nations find sexual pressure on the job and another
study conducted at Cornell University in which 92% of the 155 respondents found
sexual harassment to be a serious problem and 70% had actually suffered from it);
Lindsey, Sexual Harassment on the Job, Ms., November, 1977, at 47.
A complaint filed in the Alaska federal district court alleged that the female plain-
tiff was rejected for the position of equal employment officer because, ironically, she
refused to engage in sex acts with the employer's senior management official. Rinkel
v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, Inc., No. 74-329 (D. Alas., filed June 29, 1977).
Another suit was recently brought in a closely related area. Four female students and
a male professor filed a class action suit in the federal district court at New Haven,
Conn., charging Yale University with sex discrimination for sexual harassment of
female students by their male professors. TIME, Aug. 8, 1977, at 52.
6. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976);
Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975); Barnes v. Train,
13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974).
7. Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
8. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
9. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cast. 123 (D.D.C. 1974).
10. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975).
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somewhat different. The two female plaintiffs claimed that because of
the offensive verbal and physical sexual advances of their male super-
visor they had to resign, and therefore were constructively terminated.
The two concerns of the Barnes court were reiterated and a third
theme added-that recognizing sexual harassment as a proscribed ac-
tivity would open the doors of the courtroom to a flood of baseless lit-
igation. In response to these concerns, the court found that plaintiffs
failed to state a cause of action under Title VII. While rejecting the
Come court's contention that a supervisor's acts are not to be imputed
to the employer, the opinion in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric &
Gas Co.," the most recent of the cases, once again held that sexual
harassment is not harassment on the basis of sex and found that
plaintiff's termination for refusing the sexual advances of her super-
visor was not actionable under Title VII. There, too, the court was
very concerned that the floodgates would be opened and that the
courts would be, in effect, tampering with nature if they were to at-
tempt to regulate in this area.
Tomkins was decided after two courts had found Title VII to be
applicable to sexual harassment cases: the first, in Williams v.
Saxbe,' 2 unabashedly proclaimed sexual harassment to be sex discrim-
ination; the other, in Miller v. Bank of America,13 more cautiously
admitted that there might be situations in which sex discrimination
could-be found. In Williams, the court found that plaintiffs termina-
tion for refusing to date her supervisor was sex-based discrimination,
thus disposing of the first of the earlier courts' concerns. It found fur-
ther that whether the supervisor was imposing an employment policy
or practice was a question for factual determination, and that if it was
found to be the policy of the supervisor, then it was also the policy of
the employer. Requiring such a factual finding, it asserted, would en-
sure that the courts would not become bogged down with baseless
claims. Although somewhat reluctantly agreeing with the Williams
court that sexual harassment could state a cause of action, the Miller
court joined the Barnes court in voicing the concern that such a
holding might expose the courts to a barrage of sexual harassment
cases. As a result, the Miller court established rather stringent proof
requirements, and rejected the particular plaintiff 's claim that she was
11. 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.NJ. 1976).
12. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
13. 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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terminated for being sexually uncooperative. This determination in
Miller was used to support the Tomkins court's contention that sexual
harassment stated no Title VII cause of action, 14 when, in fact, Mill-
er's holding went only to the degree of proof necessary.
This comment will focus on the three major themes raised by these
decisions: (1) whether sexual harassment is or can be gender-based;
(2) whether or not the supervisor must be treated as the representative
of the employer; and (3) whether recognition of a Title VII cause of
action will inundate the courts with unfounded claims of harassment.
After exploring the approaches and analyses of the various courts, the
comment concludes that sexual harassment can constitute a violation
of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination; and that whether
it does or not is basically a question of fact.
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS GENDER-BASED
DISCRIMINATION
The most difficult task facing the plaintiff in sexual harassment
cases is showing that she was subjected to the objectionable treatment
because of her sex. All of the courts holding Title VII inapplicable to
cases of sexual harassment have done so by concluding, through var-
ious means, that however discriminatory the practice might be, it was
not based on sex. They have accomplished this by finding either that
since sex was not the only factor involved 15 (so-called "sex-plus" dis-
crimination), or that since the practice could as easily have been di-
rected at males, 16 it was not gender-based discrimination. When there
has been only one incident of sexual harassment, the act is not on its
face gender-based, and the second of these arguments becomes a
forceful one. 17 Although the courts have employed this reasoning to
reject the underlying Title VII cause of action, it will be shown that
14. The Miller court very explicitly found that a cause of action could be stated:
"Obviously, as in Williams v. Saxbe, . . . there may be situations in which a sex dis-
crimination action can be maintained for an employer's active, or tacit approval, of
a personnel policy requiring sex favors as a condition of employment." 418 F. Supp.
at 236.
15. See text accompanying notes 36-47 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 20-3 5 infra.
17. Observing the harassing act in a sociological vacuum, gender could well
appear irrelevant. The same problem would arise if a single black person were dis-
charged-with neither an express verbalization nor statistical evidence of racial basis
for the firing, it would be difficult to show discrimination.
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this consideration should reach only the question of proof, and not
whether a cause of action has been stated.' 8
Because the Act does not proscribe all types of discrimination,' 9 the
threshold question must be whether the gender variable is present-
if the disparate treatment is totally arbitrary or falls on a group not
explicitly covered, the statute will offer no protection. Consequently,
if sex is not a variable there can be no sex discrimination within the
meaning of Title VII.
A. Characteristics Peculiar to One Gender
The courts in both Come 20 and Tomkins2' held that it would be
ludicrous to hold sexual harassment of women actionable under Title
VII because there would be no basis for suit if the harassment were
directed equally toward males. Certainly it is true that once a policy,
however offensive, is applied equally to all parties concerned, there is
no discrimination.2 2 Nevertheless, without evidence that male em-
ployees are subjected to the same type of harassment, the argument
becomes pointless. It is no answer to a charge of discrimination to
show that under other circumstances the conduct complained of
would be non-discriminatory. 23
To hold otherwise is to concur with those who insist that Title VII
prohibits only those practices that discriminate on the basis of charac-
teristics that are peculiar to one gender. 24 This reading would severely
18. See text accompanying notes 48-62 infra.
19. E.g, King v. Seaboard Coast Line Ry., 538 F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1976) (dis-
crimination in favor of "drunks" does not state a cause of action under Title VII-
Title VII only protects against discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin); Bradington v. International Business Machs. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 845
(D. Md. 1973) (no federal statute prohibits discrimination per se-in order to state
a cause of action under Title VII the discriminatory conduct must be based on race,
color, sex, religion, or national origin).
20. 390 F. Supp. at 163.
21. 422 F. Supp. at 556.
22. EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6100 (1970).
23. If, for example, an employer required its black employees to perform undesir-
able work that its white employees were not required to perform, that would be dis-
criminatory. However, if all employees were required to do the same unpleasant
work, they might complain but they could not charge discrimination. That this second,
neutral, situation is conceivable does not make the first any less discriminatory. The
fact that sexual harassment might be applied to men as well as women under
another set of circumstances does not negate the conclusion that it is discriminatory
when it is applied only to women. United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,
7 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6461 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
24. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976) (argument of de-
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limit the application of the Act. The list of immutable sex-linked char-
acteristics that might affect employment decisions is not very long-
pregnancy, 25 beards, 26 breasts,27 and, in some very limited instances,
sex organs28 would fall into this category-and to restrict Title VII to
these categories would render it virtually meaningless. Furthermore,
this construction appears to contradict actual holdings in the area.29
The courts that have dealt with these immutable characteristics have
reasoned that there is no discrimination, since similarly situated per-
sons of the other sex are not treated differently.30 The Supreme Court,
in Geduldig v. Aiello,3' found that it was not violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to exclude pregnancy
from disability insurance coverage and, in General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bert,3 2 extended the holding to cases arising under Title VII. The
Court stated in General Electric that there was no risk from which
men were protected and women were not-that is, persons of one sex
were not treated differently from similarly situated persons of the
other. Hence, discrimination on the basis of the immutable character-
istic of pregnancy was found to be not actionable. Lower courts have
come to the same conclusion concerning beards 33 and breasts.3
4 It
fendant that discrimination must be based upon characteristic peculiar to one gender
rejected by court).
25. E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976) (exclusion of preg-
nancy-related disabilities from the employer's disability benefits plan does not violate
Title VII); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (California's disability insurance
coverage found constitutional under the equal protection clause of the 14th amend-
ment in spite of its exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities).
26. Rafford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla.
1972) (since only men can grow beards the discharge of a bearded man for facial
hair was found not to violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
27. State Div. of Human Rights ex rel. Chamberlain v. Indian Valley Realty Corp.,
Case No. CS-21209-70, N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd. (1970), cited in A.
LARSON, infra note 30, at 3-22 n.58 (not sex discrimination to fire a waitress for being
too flat-chested).
28. The sex organs of a sperm donor or a prostitute would constitute such immut-
able characteristics.
29. See notes 25-27 supra.
30. To arrive at such a conclusion, however, the courts have had to disregard the
fact that the very use of the sex-exclusive standard in the first place constitutes sex
differentiation. A better conclusion would be to find sex discrimination wherever
women are treated differently from mep, and then turn to the facts to determine if
there is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), see note 39 infra, that might
justify such treatment. 1 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: SEX § 12.12 (1975).
31. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
32. 97S. Ct. 401 (1976).
33. Rafford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
34. State Div. of Human Rights ex rel. Chamberlain v. Indian Valley Realty Corp.,
Case No. CS-21209-70, N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd. (1970), cited in A.
LARSON, supra note 30, at 3-22 n.58.
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seems reasonable to conclude that sex discrimination will be found
not when there is differential treatment based on immutable charac-
teristics, but only in those instances when the practice could affect
both sexes but is, in fact, being imposed on only one.35 Sexual harass-
ment certainly satisfies this test.
B. "Sex-Plus" Analysis
Another defense to the charge of sex discrimination has been that
the plaintiff was discriminated against because she refused to engage
in a sexual affair with her supervisor, and not because she was a
woman.3 6 This defense in its most basic form would find sex discrimi-
nation only if gender were the sole determining variable. The argu-
ment seemingly has been revived expressly to deal with the factual
patterns of sexual harassment cases, in which there is an additional
variable: the "willingness vel non to furnish sexual consideration. 37 It
is true that at one time such an additional factor could have served to
defeat the cause of action, 38 but it has long been established that so-
called "sex-plus" discrimination is as invidious as sex discrimination
alone.39
35. This conclusion is borne out in the case law. Decisions such as Lansdale v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 437 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying no-marriage rule
only to female airline stewardesses violates Title VII), Sprogis v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (a policy requiring female but not male flight
attendants to be unmarried is violative of Title VII), and Harrington v. Vandalia-
Butter Bd. of Educ., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 702 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (inferior work-
ing conditions of female physical education teacher found actionable under. Title VII),
found practices to be discriminatory that could easily have been applied to male em-
ployees but were in fact imposed only on women.
36. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974); Williams v.
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976) (court rejecting this defense).
37. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976).
38. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied,
416 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 400 U.S. 542 (1970). The court of appeals
stated: "The discrimination was based on a two-pronged qualification, i.e., a woman
with pre-school age children. Ida Phillips was not refused employment because she
was a woman nor because she had pre-school age children. It is the coalescence of
these two elements that denied her the position she desired." 411 F.2d at 4.
39. The Supreme Court, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1970),
fortunately invalidated the "sex-plus" analysis of the court of appeals. Chief Judge
Brown's dissent to the denial of rehearing at the circuit court level pointed out the
potential danger of the "sex-plus" analysis:
If "sex plus" stands, the Act is dead. This follows from the Court's repeated
declaration that the employer is not forbidden to discriminate as to non-statutory
factors. Free to add non-sex factors, the rankest sort of discrimination against
women can be worked by employers. This could include, for example, all sorts of
physical characteristics, such as minimum weight (175 lbs.), minimum shoulder
129
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In 1965, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) 40 promulgated a rule rejecting the defense that women per se
were not discriminated against when married women were treated dif-
ferently from married men: "so long as sex is a factor in the applica-
tion of the rule, such application involves a discrimination based on
sex."41 Thus, under this rule, the additional variable of marriage
cannot serve to obscure the gender-based nature of the discrimination.
The principle was firmly established in Phillips v. Martin Marietta
width, minimum biceps measurement, minimum lifting capacity (100 lbs.), and
the like.
416 F.2d at 1260 (footnotes omitted) (Brown, CJ., dissenting).
40. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970) and given powers of enforcement under 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5 (1970). It has the power to receive complaints, issue charges, attempt con-
ciliation, request preliminary relief from the district court if necessary, bring suit in
the federal court, and intercede in any Title VII litigation.
Although Congress empowered the EEOC to investigate, conciliate, and recom-
mend, rather than to adjudicate, its decisions have been given much weight by the
judiciary. The Supreme Court stated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433
(1971), that the EEOC's administrative interpretations of Title VII are entitled to
great deference. Professor Cornelius Peck submits that "without powers of either ad-
judication or substantive rulemaking, [the EEOC] has made pronouncements about
the statute that are accepted by the courts as authoritative statements of the law."
Peck, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Developments in the Admin-
istrative Process 1965-1975, 51 WASH. L. REV. 831, 832 (1976). The Court's ex-
planation for rejecting the EEOC guideline on pregnancy in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
97 S. Ct. 401 (1976), however, could be read to weaken this traditional deference. Id.
at 410-13. The Court stated that it agreed with the role it gave to "interpretive rulings
such as the EEOC guidelines" in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). In
Skidmore, the Court stated:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator
under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority,
do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
Id. at 140. It must be assumed, however, that the courts have always weighed such
factors before accepting an EEOC decision, for surely no amount of deference
would render acceptable that which was poorly reasoned and fleetingly considered.
That the Court here rejected the EEOC guideline must not be taken to mean that the
traditional deference was not given, but merely that the guideline failed to meet the
Court's criteria. As before, the strength of an EEOC decision lies in the force of its
logic, not the force of its authority.
41. The full rule, entitled "Discrimination against married women," reads as
follows:
The Commission has determined that an employer's rule which forbids or re-
stricts the employment of married women and which is not applicable to married
men is a discrimination based on sex prohibited by title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. It does not seem to us relevant that the rule is not directed against all females,
but only against married females, for so long as sex is a factor in the application
of the rule, such application involves a discrimination based on sex.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.4(a) (1976).
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Corp.,42 in which the Supreme Court dealt with a company policy
excluding from employment women, but not men, with pre-school age
children. The Court found that Title VII did not allow one hiring
policy for women and another for men, even though a second variable
-pre-school age children-was an integral part of the discriminatory
policy.43 This principle has since been recognized by courts which
have prohibited such disparate treatment as requiring female flight
attendants to remain unmarried while allowing male flight attendants
to marry,44 and excluding from employment unwed mothers but not
unwed fathers. 45
42. 400 U.S. 542 (1970).
43. Id. at 544. The Supreme Court remanded to the lower court for an opinion
on whether the differential treatment of women and men with pre-school age children
might bejustifiable under the bona fide occupational qualification exemption, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e) (1970). 400 U.S. at 544.
Section 2000e-2(e) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees,
for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual,
for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for em-
ployment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-
management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining
programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of
his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise, and (2) it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other edu-
cational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a
particular religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institu-
tion or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported,
controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corpora-
tion, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university,
or other educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the
propagation of a particular religion.
This bona fide occupational qualification exception is being narrowly defined by
the Commission and courts alike. K. DECROW, SEXIST JUSTICE 108 (1975). 'The
Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification exception as to sex
should be interpreted narrowly." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1976). Accord, Diaz v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)
(adopting Commission guidelines that the BFOQ exception as to sex should be in-
terpreted narrowly); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971)
(concluding that Commission is correct in determining that BFOQ establishes a nar-
row exception); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969)
(to deprive women of certain jobs under the BFOQ exception the burden is on em-
ployer to show that "all or substantially all" women would not be able to perform
the duties of the position involved); Cheatwood v. South Central Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969) (accepting Weeks' narrow interpretation of BFOQ
exception).
44. E.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (a
policy requiring female but not male flight attendants to be unmarried violates Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Lansdale v. United Air Lines, Inc., 437 F.2d
454 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying no-marriage rule only to female airline stewardesses
131
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In Williams v. Saxbe,46 the court found that the additional factor of
sexual consideration did not differ from the "no marriage" and the
"no pre-school age children" rules described above. The court con-
cluded:
It was and is sufficient to allege a violation of Title VII to claim that
the rule creating an artificial barrier to employment has been applied
to one gender and not to the other. Therefore, this Court finds that
plaintiff has stated a violation of Title V1I's prohibition against "any
discrimination based on ... sex." '47
In light of the history of sex-plus discrimination, this conclusion is
inescapable provided it can be found that the "artificial barrier" of
requiring sexual consideration was indeed applied to one gender and
not the other. Regardless of the outcome of this factual determination,
the underlying cause of action has certainly been established.
C. A Discernible Pattern of Discrimination
Conceptually, then, sexual harassment can be considered sex dis-
crimination. Having reached this conclusion, however, it remains very
difficult to determine from the particular facts of any given case if
gender is an operative variable. It is highly probable that any court
would recognize as sex discrimination an articulated policy making
employment of women contingent upon the giving of sexual favors. It
is conceptually more difficult, however, when the policy is unstated
and only one woman is subject to the requirement.
Finding the presence of the gender variable is a major obstacle
when there is only one woman who has been sexually harassed. 48 If it
cannot be shown statistically that only women are affected by a sexual-
favor requirement, it must be determined in some other manner that
the requirement was imposed on the employee because of her sex
violates Title VII); Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(a regulation requiring female flight attendants, but not male flight attendants, to re-
sign upon marriage is unlawful).
45. Andrews v. Drew Mun. School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'g
371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973). When a policy of not employing unwed parents
affected only unwed mothers, the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment was
found to be violated. This type of discrimination was found by the EEOC to be ac-
tionable under Title VII as well. 2 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. 1016 (1970).
46. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
47. Id. at 659 (footnote omitted).
48. See note 17 supra.
132
Vol. 53: 123, 1977
Sexual Harassment
rather than for another, nonactionable, reason. In other areas of Title
VII's purview, neither the courts49 nor the EEOC 50 have hesitated to
find discrimination when there was only one victim. It seems, how-
ever, that sexual harassment is perceived as a unique situation: the
Miller court decided that only in the case of consistent sex-based dis-
crimination should the courts become involved; the Williams court
may have reached the same conclusion when it found that to state a
claim it was essential that the conduct complained of be a policy im-
posed on the plaintiff and other women.51
Although the fact that more than one woman has been subjected to
a discriminatory practice tends to establish that it was applied on the
basis of sex, an allegation of multiple incidents is not essential to a
complaint of sexual harassment.5 2 There are several ways to deter-
mine the presence of the gender variable when there has been only a
single instance of harassment. One's initial reaction is likely to be that
if a male supervisor has sexually harassed a female employee, her
gender was a critical variable. This reaction could be based either on
the presumption that the supervisor is heterosexual, or the belief that
sexual harassment reflects a general stereotyped view of women, or
both. Were the courts to adopt either of these approaches, the plaintiff
could establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination simply by
49. E.g., Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 702
(S.D. Ohio 1976) (imposition of inferior working conditions upon female physical
education teacher found actionable under Title VII); Anderson v. Methodist Evangel-
ical Hosp., Inc., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6944 (W.D. Ky. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 723 (6th
Cir. 1972) (corporation held liable for supervisor's race-based firing of individual em-
ployee).
50. E.g., EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6283 (1971) (policy forbidding long dresses
found to discriminate against plaintiff whose religion required that she wear a long
dress, even though she was the only person so affected); EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6087
(1969) (firing a single black employee for "self-confident" manner found to violate
Title VII); EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6085 (1969) (tolerating the telling of Polish jokes
and making of derogatory remarks about employee's ancestry by fellow employees
found actionable under Title VII, even though other employees of Polish descent were
not offended). See note 40 supra, for weight accorded EEOC decisions.
51. The Williams court found that it was an "essential allegation" that the "super-
visor's conduct was a policy or practice imposed on the plaintiff and other women
similarly situated." 413 F. Supp. at 660 n.8. This statement is rather ambiguous, and a
cursory reading might suggest a requirement that more than one woman have suffered
the supervisor's conduct. Read in context, however, where it is asserted to counter-
balance the contention that such conduct was a "nonemployment related personal en-
counter," id. at 660, one might reasonably conclude that the court meant only that
the conduct must be a "policy" as opposed to an "isolated personal incident," and
that the phrase "plaintiff and other women" was included merely as identification of
the aggrieved parties.
52. See cases cited in notes 49 & 50 supra.
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showing that the harassment occurred. Should the court not make
these presumptions there is yet a third, more difficult, means of
finding the gender variable-a factual determination of the supervi-
sor's sexual orientation. 53
To make such a factual determination, the court or the Commis-
sion would, in effect, have to invade the defendant's privacy to deter-
mine liability on the basis of an affirmatively proven sexual prefer-
ence. For policy reasons, it would seem better to avoid this type of
investigation. Invading sexual privacy is questionable even for the
most compelling reasons, 54 here it would serve only to make a nice
distinction between prohibited discriminatory sexual harassment and
permitted random sexual harassment. An initial presumption of heter-
osexuality would salvage the supervisor's right of privacy to some ex-
tent, because the decision to introduce contrary evidence of his sexual
orientation would be his. Such a presumption, however, should not be
lightly made. Establishing heterosexuality as a legally acceptable
norm encourages the tendency to consider deviations from this norm
as not only different, but indefensibly abnormal. Yet, should the court
not accept the following analysis, such a presumption may be neces-
sary.
The most palatable route would be judicial recognition of the ster-
eotypic implications of sexual harassment.5 5 Clearly, women are fre-
quently perceived and treated as "sex objects" by men. The ubiquitous
"men's" magazines-Playboy, Penthouse, Oui, and the like-with
their demeaning photographs and humor, portray women as essen-
tially sexual entities. 56 Every big city has its "combat zone" where
adult book stores, peep shows, X-rated movies, strip shows, and mas-
sage parlors abound. The incidence of rape continues to climb,57 and
53. It is interesting that at least the Tomkins court so readily accepts the possibility
of bisexual supervisors-"The gender lines might as easily have been . . . not crossed
at all." 422 F. Supp. at 556 (emphasis added). The courts have not always been so
liberal. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
54. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (denying married
adults access to birth control information and devices found to invade individual's
right to privacy and violate the 14th amendment).
55. For discussion of sex stereotyping in a sexual harassment context, see Brief for
Plaintiff at 13-17, Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.NJ.
1976), and 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 148, 153-59 (1976).
56. The monthly circulation figures for some of the largest of these magazines are:
Playboy-5,405,443, Penthouse-4,365,679, Oui-1,258,249 . '77 AYER DIRECTORY OF
PUBLICATIONS 301, 642 (1977).
57. In 1974 there was one forcible rape in the United States every ten minutes.
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prostitution flourishes. 58 The courts might well take judicial notice of
the stereotype of woman as sex object.
Once the existence of such a gender-linked stereotype has been es-
tablished, it can be utilized to infer the gender-linked character of the
sexual harassment in question. If a woman has been transferred, fired,
or not hired due to her refusal to tolerate sexual harassment, and her
supervisor cannot provide a reasonable explanation for her treatment,
then it can be presumed that it was based on the stereotype. In other
situations, courts have been willing to draw comparable inferences
from the sociological milieu in which the act occurred,59 and the
EEOC has expressly found that "repellent historical images" have a
disparate effect. 60 When a woman has been treated as a "sex object"
rather than a competent employee, it is not unreasonable to suppose
that such treatment was based on a prevailing stereotype. That suppo-
sition leads directly to the conclusion that the harassment is actionable
under Title VII, for the courts have uniformly condemned as discrimi-
natory all stereotypic treatment based on sex.61 Perpetuating a sex-
object stereotype in the realm of employment is flatly contrary to the
intention of Congress in passing the Act.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES
9 (1975). Forcible rapes increased by 8% from 1973 to 1974, id. at 22, and 5% in
the first three months of 1977, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (January-March 1977). "Forcible rapes increased
146 percent from 1960 to 1971 and during 1972 rose sharply while the incidence of
other serious crimes declined." B. BABcOcK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES & REMEDIES 823 (1975) (citing FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING (January-June 1972) and
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES
61(1972)).
58. In 1975 there were 68,200 arrests for prostitution and commercialized vice in
the United States. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR
THE UNITED STATES 179 (1976).
59. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). "In approaching this
problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the amendment was adopted, or
even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education
in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout
the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools de-
prives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 492-93.
60. 4 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. 441 (1971) (EEOC found that referring to female
employees, particularly black female employees, as "girls" evoked "repellent historical
images" and was therefore a form of sex discrimination).
61. E.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)
("Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes"); Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't
of Water & Power, 387 F. Supp. 980, 984 (C.D. Cal. 1975) ("In short, under the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, all stereotypic treatment ot persons
based on race, religion, or sex whether rational or irrational is dead"); Ridinger v.
General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1096 (S.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd on other
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With this approach, as with the initial presumption of heterosex-
uality, the supervisor is placed in the rather difficult position of being
able to avoid legal sanctions only by exposing himself to the very
likely more damning societal sanctions against bisexuality. 62 This situ-
grounds, 474 Fo2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972) (by enacting Title VII "Congress intended to
prevent employers from refusing to hire an individual based on stereotyped character-
izations of the sexes").
See also Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Per-
spective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 675, 704-05 (1971):
These ordinances reflect two different facets of the female stereotype in the
mythology of male supremacy. On the one hand, the female is viewed as a pure,
delicate and vulnerable creature who must be protected from exposure to immoral
influences; and on the other, as a brazen temptress, from whose seductive blandish-
ments the innocent male must be protected. Every woman is either Eve or Little
Eva-and either way she loses.
Accord, Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. at 658: "On its face, the statute clearly
does not limit discrimination to sex stereotypes." A sex stereotype, however, can be
a shorthand way of describing discriminatory treatment. If a stereotype is sex based
it is applied only to one sex and treatment applied only to one sex is discriminatory-
thus sex stereotypes are no more than a subset of sex discrimination.
62. It is particularly in this twilight area that one suspects that perhaps Title VII is
not the perfect solution to the problem of sexual harassment. Sexual harassment in
any context, imposed on any individual, should not be tolerated. However, simply
because the conduct is also intolerable outside the parameters of sex-based employ-
ment discrimination does not mean that Title VII should not be used to attack the
circumscribed aspect of this conduct to which it is applicable. In this instance, it is only
the discriminatory application that is being attacked, not the evil conduct itself. This is
not a concern unique to the area of sexual harassment; it is rather a recurring philo-
sophical problem in the area of employment discrimination. Whereas the uttering of the
epithet "nigger" is offensive in any context, it is actionable under Title VII only when
used in the course of employment. No matter how objectionable the treatment, if it is
applied outside the employment context, or is applied uniformly to all employees
within the employment context, or discriminates on some basis other than race, sex,
color, religion, or national origin, it will not be found actionable under Title VII. See
note 19 supra. Nonetheless, the fact that Title VII cannot cure all social ills is no
reason to preclude it from curing those to which it is addressed.
To get at the underlying evil, one would have to take some other route. There are
several tort remedies that might conceivably provide relief. If the harassment is phy-
sical the employee might sue the supervisor for battery, but this would limit her
relief to whatever damages (compensatory and exemplary) she could get from the
supervisor. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 34-37 (4th ed. 1971). It is possible that
the employer might be reached through application of the doctrine of respondeat
superior, under which the servant's acts are imputed to the master. Were this possible,
the remedy would be more viable because the employer's resources are generally
greater than the supervisor's. In order to invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior,
it is necessary that the employee have been acting with the scope of his or her employ-
ment. In order to be within the scope of agency, the conduct must have been actuated,
at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY § 228 (1958). Prosser suggests that it is particularly difficult to find liability
when the employee has committed an intentional tort for purely personal reasons,
although there has been a recent trend toward recovery on the ground that the em-
ployment provided the opportunity and incentive for the act. W. PROSSER, supra, § 70,
at 466 (citing Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, 243 F.2d 331 (3d Cir.
1957) (insurance company's field underwriter represented himself to be a doctor, and
made an indecent examination of an applicant for insurance)).
Recovery for emotional distress is probably not feasible since it has thus far been
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ation might be somewhat distasteful, but it is presumably a solution
society can tolerate. The supervisor is not being denied a defense-he
can show either that there was no harassment or that he is bisexual.6 3
It is unlikely, however, that there will be much sympathy generated
for the predicament of the bisexual supervisor whose victim, only by
happenstance, was female.
limited to either outrageous conduct situations or to situations in which another tort
has already been inflicted. Once again, relief is limited to what can be recovered from
the supervisor unless the doctrine of respondeat superior can be invoked. W. PROSSER,
supra, § 12.
There has been some support for finding discrimination itself to be a tort, in which
case there would be basis for an emotional distress claim. Humphrey v. Southwestern
Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974) (where black employee appeared to have suffered
psychic injury when white employee was promoted instead of him, there should be a
jury trial to determine damages); Note, Employment Discrimination Litigation: The
Availability of Damages, 44 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 497 (1976); 54 VA. L. REv. 491 (1968).
This approach, however, provides only an additional remedy once discrimination is
found, rather than an alternative to finding discrimination.
Another possible area of tort relief is interference with contract. W. PROSSER, supra,
§ 129, at 932-33. It has frequently been held that since a contract-at-will is a subsisting
relationship until terminated, interference with such a contract is actionable. Again,
this is limited to damages against the supervisor. Because this cause of action requires
that the supervisor be seen as a third party, there is even less chance here that the
doctrine of respondeat superior may be successfully invoked.
A particularly appealing remedy, and one that seems to be attracting an increasing
number of proponents, is the simple contract remedy for breach. In a recent New
Hampshire case, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974),
a woman employee who was terminated from her job for refusing a sexual relation-
ship with her supervisor was reinstated with back pay when the court found that such
conduct constituted a breach of contract-at-will. The court held that "a termination by
the employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or
malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system or the
public good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract." 316 A.2d at 551.
With regard to the conception that the terminable-at-will employment contract
may be terminated for any reason, it has been argued that "[d] iscarding this concept
will cause no catastrophic legal change but will simply balance the equities of the
parties in accordance with their obvious understanding . . . and will conform with
today's social and economic realities. The doctrine was judicially created and should
be judicially re-evaluated and discarded." Brief for Appellant at 33, Roberts v. Atlan-
tic Richfield Co., 88 Wn. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977). Much support has been gen-
erated for this theory. See, e.g., Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom:
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967);
7 CONN. L. REV. 758 (1975); 26 HASTINGs LJ. 1435 (1975); 63 Ky. L.J. 513 (1975);
35 LA. L. REv. 710 (1975); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 335 (1974).
63. Bisexuality would certainly not be an irrebuttable defense-although a bi-
sexual supervisor may not have a sexual preference for women, he might still harass
only women in response to the prevailing stereotype. The employee can always
attempt to prove this pattern of harassment, but unless the supervisor had a history
of such conduct it seems unlikely that she would prevail.
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II. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF SUPERVISOR
Even if the courts were to accept the foregoing analysis, they would
still be faced with the question whether the acts of the supervisor can
be imputed to the employer and, if so, under what circumstances.
That an employer is responsible for the behavior of its agents within
the course of their employment is a well established doctrine, 64 and is
explicitly set out in the statute.65 However, the Corne66 court came
very close to rejecting this policy when it stated that "[a] reasonably
intelligent reading of the statute demonstrates it can only mean that
an unlawful employment practice must be discrimination on the part
of the employer. '67
In a further attempt to vindicate the employer, the Come court
found that the supervisor's conduct was nothing more than a "per-
sonal urge" or "proclivity." The Barnes court, too, found that some
significance inhered in calling such conduct "personal." The useful-
ness of these observations is not readily apparent, but they seem to be
attempts to remove the activity from the employment context in order
that it not be imputed to the employer. This defense is not absolute,
however, because-regardless of the personal motivations of the su-
pervisor-if the consequences contravene the Act, the conduct is
64. E.g., Walthall v. Blue Shield, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 933 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(employees failed to present adequate evidence to support their claim of racial harass-
ment, but had there been factual allegations tending to prove the harassment, the em-
ployer could have been held liable for the harassment by lower level management peo-
ple despite an exemplary record); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. 522
(W.D. Pa. 1973) (employer responsible for acts of supervisory personnel); Slack v.
Havens, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 885 (S.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir.
1975) (employer held responsible for supervisor's discriminatory firing of four black
women); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 436 (D. Utah 1971) ("Little,
if any, progress in eradicating discrimination in employment will be made if the cor-
porate employer is able to hide behind the shield of individual employee action");
Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6944 (W.D. Ky.
1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972) (notice of race discrimination to supervisory
agents of a corporation constitutes notice to the corporation since it speaks through its
agents); EEOC Dec. (CCH) $ 6347 (1972) (an employer is responsible for the actions
of its supervisors); EEOC Dec. (CCH 1 6193 (1970) (unlawful for supervisor to dis-
charge white employee for associating with black employees and his actions will be
imputed to his employer); EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6085 (1969) (knowledge of super-
visor is deemed knowledge of employer).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970) includes the agent of an employer within the
meaning of the term "employer." See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F.
Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976); Slack v. Havens, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 885 (S.D. Cal.
1973), aff'd, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
66. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975).
67. Id. at 163. In a footnote, the Tomkins court took issue with the apparent re-
jection of the doctrine of respondeat superior by the Corne court. 422 F. Supp. at 556.
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thereby -proscribed.68 The terms "personal" and "non-employment
related" are not interchangeable. As the Williams court pointed out, a
factual determination is necessary to find whether the supervisor's
conduct is symptomatic of an employment policy or is instead a non-
employment related personal encounter.69 The question can only be
answered on a case-by-case basis, although some general guidelines
can be drawn. It is obvious that when a supervisor's personal urges
affect the hiring, firing, or working conditions of an employee, his
conduct ceases to be totally private. In order to give any effect to the
Act, courts must and do hold that when a protected individual is fired
because of the personal prejudices and biases of his or her supervisor
the Act applies.70 The EEOC has found that conduct as seemingly
personal as discussing religion,71 telling Polish jokes,72 or using the
term "nigger '7 3 could be employment related and thus proscribed by
the Act if an atmosphere of intimidation were thereby created. Surely,
having sexual consideration made a job requirement or being sub-
jected to physical and verbal sexual advances could create an equally
intimidating atmosphere.
68. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("The Act pro-
scribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation"); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975) (court
looks to the consequences of the employment practices rather than to the intent to
discriminate); Sims v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 65, 353 F. Supp. 22, 25 (N.D.
Ohio 1972) ("the thrust of the Act is to the consequences of employment practices, not
simply the motivation").
69. 413 F. Supp. at 660. Accord, Howard v. National Cash Register Co., 388
F. Supp. 603, 605 (S.D. Ohio 1975) ("Whether or not the defendant has engaged in
acts of discrimination is essentially a question of fact to be resolved on a case by
case basis"); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 430 (D. Utah 1971)
("In a case such as this, the trier of fact determines the reasons for an employee's
discharge based on 'reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of facts, the con-
glomerate of activities, and the entire web of circumstances presented by the evidence
on the record as a whole' "); Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., 3 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 6944, 6947 (W.D. Ky. 1971), affid, 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972) (trial
court concluded that the "[q] uestion of whether employer was guilty of discriminatory
practice is basically one of fact for determination on a case by case basis").
70. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 885 (S.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd,
522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975) (employer responsible for supervisor's firing of four
black women for failing to "stay in their place"); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co.,
369 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (employer is responsible for supervisor's carrying
out feelings of hostility toward women).
71. E.g., EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6347 (1972) (interference with job performance
caused by supervisor's discussing his religious convictions with employees found to be
discrimination on the basis of religion under Title VII).
72. EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6085 (1969) (tolerating the telling of Polish jokes and
making of derogatory remarks about employee's ancestry by fellow employees is
found actionable under Title VII).
73. E.g., EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6193 (1970) (unlawful for supervisor to call
black employee "nigger," and his actions will be imputed to the employer).
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While not rejecting the view that an employer can be liable for tac-
itly approved acts of its supervisors, the Miller court suggested that
when an employer adopts a mechanism for preventing sexual discrim-
ination, tacit approval cannot be found, thus placing the supervisor in
the same position as any other employee. This assertion flies in the
face of a strong judicial policy of recognizing employer responsibility
for a supervisor's actions, 74 even when the employer has been found
to have "an outstanding record in regard to fair and impartial treat-
ment of the races."' 75 In light of the many EEOC decisions requiring
an atmosphere free from intimidation, even by fellow employees,76
hiding behind the label of "employee" is unlikely to exculpate the of-
fending supervisor. 77
The Corne court stated finally that, for conduct to qualify as a
policy of employment, the employer must have benefited from it in
74. See note 64, supra.
75. Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6944, 6946
(W.D. Ky. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972).
76. E.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971); EEOC Dec. (CCH)
6387 (1973) (employer found responsible for racial harassment of Spanish surnamed
employee which culminated in employee quitting); EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6354 (1972)
(where employer was aware of harassment of black and Spanish surnamed em-
ployees by both supervisory and nonsupervisory personnel and did not take reasonable
steps to eliminate it, discrimination was found); EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6311 (1971)
(employer's failure to remedy harassment of Mexican-American by employees when
employer became aware of the situation and the subsequent discharge of the employee
for not getting along with fellow workers found to be national origin discrimination);
EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6290, at 4512 (1971) ("Title VII requires an employer to
maintain a working environment free of sex-based intimidation"). See note 40 supra
for weight accorded EEOC decisions.
77. The Miller court found that the existence of a policy of discouraging sexual
harassment, and a policy of disciplining the employees found guilty of such conduct,
was evidence that the employee's conduct could not be imputed to the employer bank.
It is true that if the bank had a history of affirmatively disciplining those guilty,
and of actively investigating claims of discrimination rather than simply a policy of
doing so, then it might be proper that it be found not liable. The mere existence of
such a policy and nothing more, however, cannot exonerate the employer. See, e.g.,
EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6321 (1971).
Most of the cases prohibiting a discriminatory atmosphere require, in addition, "posi-
tive action where positive action is necessary to eliminate employee intimidation."
EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6030, at 4056 (1969). Accord, EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6290
(1971). It is not enough that an employer establish a policy deploring discriminatory
harassment: "The mere announcement of a policy against racial discrimination is not
sufficient when management has reason to believe that racial discrimination is occur-
ring. Management must take steps to insure that the policy is observed at all levels."
EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6013, at 4033 (1969).
In the case of a supervisor's misconduct, because an employer is responsible for the
actions of its supervisors, it is questionable whether there can be exoneration even in
the face of a vigorously exercised policy. A policy not uniformly exercised should
certainly not serve to exculpate an employer. See, e.g., EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6347
(1972) (supervisor preaches only to selected employees).
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some way. This observation cannot withstand even the most cursory
analysis; by requiring that an employer benefit from discrimination
before it be found actionable, it would seem to suggest that actionable
discrimination is a profitable and therefore rational practice.78 Most
employment discrimination seems to occur not as the result of a rea-
soned decision to adopt a beneficial, albeit discriminatory policy, but
rather as a response to a personal bias or stereotype.79
III. THE COURTS' CONCERN WITH NONSUBSTANTIVE
"HOUSEKEEPING" ISSUES
The courts perceive sexual attraction as one of those areas they are
better off avoiding-the attraction of males to females is seen as a
natural part of life with which the courts feel they should not inter-
fere.80 The courts fear that if they disregard this caveat they will find
78. The suggestion that by discriminating against women, blacks, and other pro-
tected categories the employer benefits is itself discriminatory. The inference is that
by maintaining the present system of white male dominance the business will function
at its optimum level.
79. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE
COMM. ON PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT 1 (1963).
"When sex discrimination compels women to take jobs requiring less than their
capacities, or to remain out of the work force altogether, society suffers the loss of
needed talent." Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1168 n.16 (1971).
80. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 555 (D.NJ. 1976);
Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 235 (N.D. Cal. 1976). It is this type
of attitude that has contributed to the unconscionable reluctance to charge, convict,
and sentence in rape cases. One member of a jury which had convicted a woman of
second degree murder for killing her rapist revealed in an interview that he believed
no woman should be acquitted on the ground of self-defense if she killed a man
during the rape. He stated: "[T] he guy's not trying to kill her. He's just trying to give
her a good time. To get off, the guy will have to do her bodily harm, and giving a girl
a screw isn't doing her bodily harm." Ms., May, 1975, at 86.
In an analysis of Seattle rape complaints the police identified 85 suspects in con-
nection with 308 complaints. Of these, 57 were charged, but only 31 were charged
with rape or attempted rape. In subsequent trials, 17 defendants either pled guilty or
were found guilty, but 11 of those were found guilty of offenses other than rape. Only
six suspects were convicted of rape or attempted rape. Battelle Human Affairs Research
Centers, Discretionary Grant No. 75-NI-99-0015, Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration, Research and Development of Model Procedures for Criminal Justice
System Involvement with the Crime of Forcible Rape, Final Report (Nov. 10, 1975)
(unpublished report on file at Battelle Institute, Seattle, Washington). Forcible rape
has a lower conviction rate than any other crime listed in the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation's Uniform Crime Reports, and in California, no other felony has an
acquittal rate as high as rape. Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and
Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 927 & n.42. In addition, an FBI report compared rape
with some of the other major crimes against the person, and, of these crimes, forcible
rape was the least likely to be cleared by arrest. At 51%, rape ranked fourth behind
negligent manslaughter (79%), murder (78%), and aggravated assault (64%).
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themselves facing a line-drawing problem of significant proportions.81
Linedrawing, however, is a problem inherent in the law,82 and it is one
the courts must face. It is the job of the fact finder to determine what
degree of harassment is necessary to state a claim. 83 Fear of "opening
the floodgates" is common in any newly emerging area of the law; 84
there will naturally be an additional burden placed on the courts with
recognition of any new cause of action. In this area, however, courts
are accorded ample protection. The EEOC will serve as a preliminary
screening body, discouraging claimants with unsubstantiated charges
from pursuing any action, and conciliating claimants whose com-
plaints appear valid. Moreover, many potential litigants will be dis-
couraged because the burden of financial risk in Title VII cases can
be prohibitive, and it is most uncommon for the court to appoint Title
VII counsel.85 In addition, once sexual harassment is recognized as
actionable and the first cases are decided, guidelines will have been
established with precedential value. Finally, litigation in the area will
serve the further purpose of encouraging employers to establish in-
ternal means of dealing with such occurrences and might, in fact,
foster more circumspect conduct on the part of supervisors.
Clearly, there is no basis for suggesting that women are more likely
than any other protected group to flood the courts with unfounded
self-serving claims of harassment. Although the Anglo-American legal
yardstick is the "reasonable man," this does not preclude the possi-
bility that women, too, are reasonable beings.
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Nonetheless, rape is proscribed in spite of the fact that intercourse is a natural sex
phenomenon. Even bigotry might be termed "natural"-a great many prohibited ac-
tivities are "natural" but they do not fit within a civilized picture of society. In any
event, Title VII prohibits such behavior-whether or not the individual judges want
to interfere, the statute mandates that they do so.
8 1. The Miller court posed the question: "[W] ho is to say what degree of sexual
cooperation would found a Title VII claim?" 418 F. Supp. at 236.
82. E.g., Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Labor
Act: of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491, 502 (1967).
83. See note 68 supra.
84. See W. PROSSER, supra note 62, § 12, at 51 (4th ed. 1971) ("It is the business
of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litiga-
tion,' and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice
to deny relief on such grounds").
85. Dunlap, A View of Sex Discrimination Cases under Title VII: Making it
Work, in WOMEN AND THE LAW, SYMPOSIUM ON SEX DISCRIMINATION 84, 91 (1976).
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IV. CONCLUSION
As long as employers and supervisors are allowed to view women
solely in terms of their gender instead of judging them on the basis of
their individual qualifications, Title VII will have failed to fulfill its
promise of equality in the area of employment. Permitting sexual
harassment imposes conditions on women that are not impressed on
similarly situated males. In other areas of sex discrimination, that is
enough to trigger the application of the Act, and should do so here as
well.
There is, of course, some hesitation on the part of the courts to ac-
cept what appears to be a new reading of the law. What the courts
view here as a radical departure from traditional Title VII analysis,
however, flows naturally from the reasoning of preceding cases. The
Williams court properly recognized the problem as a factual one, in-
volving the questions of whether the harassment is employment re-
lated, and whether it serves to place female employees at a disadvan-
tage vis-a-vis male employees. If the answer to both of these questions
is yes, clearly the courts are compelled to find the practice to be sex
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
V. ADDENDUM
Since this comment was completed, two courts of appeals have held
that sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. In Barnes v.
Costle,86 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected
the lower court's conclusion in Barnes v. Train that the employee was
harassed not because she was a woman but because she refused a
sexual relationship. The court found that it was only because she was
a woman in a subordinate position that she was expected to engage in
a sexual affair. Her gender was considered by the court to be an indis-
pensible factor in her harassment, because a similar condition was not
imposed on a male employee, and sexual harassment was held to be
actionable under Title VII even if there is but one victim. Addition-
ally, the court of appeals disagreed with the lower court's conclusion
that the encounter resulted from an "inharmonious relationship" and
therefore fell outside the purview of Title VII. The court of appeals
held that the employer was chargeable with the Title VII violations of
86. 46 U.S.L.W. 2051 (D.C. Cir. July 27, 1977).
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its supervisor. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a one-
paragraph opinion, also held that compelling female employees to
submit to sexual advances of their male supervisors is in violation of
Title VII. 87
Kerri Weisel
87. Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977).
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